Criticism
Volume 54 | Issue 4

Article 6

2012

Shame Now: Ruth Leys Diagnoses the New Queer
Shame Culture
J. Keith Vincent
Boston University, kvincent@bu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/criticism
Recommended Citation
Vincent, J. Keith (2012) "Shame Now: Ruth Leys Diagnoses the New Queer Shame Culture," Criticism: Vol. 54: Iss. 4, Article 6.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/criticism/vol54/iss4/6

Shame Now: Ruth
Leys Diagnoses
the New Queer
Shame Culture
J. Keith Vincent
From Guilt to Shame: Auschwitz
and After by Ruth Leys. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press,
2007. Pp. 216. $25.95 paper.

In From Guilt to Shame, Ruth Leys
follows up on her earlier work on
the genealogy of trauma studies by
tracing the emergence and eventual discrediting of theories of survival guilt since the end of World
War II.1 In the process, she tells a
fascinating story of a gradual shift
in trauma studies away from psychodynamic theories that emphasized the subject’s uncontrollable
mimetic identification with the aggressor towards anti-psychoanalytic
understandings of purely external
stressors and traumatic images as
the causes of trauma. In the book’s
latter chapters, however, the focus
shifts to a critique of recent work
in affect theory, including a highly
problematic reading of the work of
the late queer theorist Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick. Leys interprets the
work of Sedgwick “and her followers” not only as a further development of the anti-psychoanalytic
tendencies that have conspired to
discredit the diagnosis of survivor
guilt, but also as symptomatic of
a larger, culturewide shift “from
guilt to shame,” away from “questions of agency and responsibility”
and towards what she misleadingly
characterizes as a disengaged and
solipsistic focus on identity. Since
the publication of this book in 2007,
Leys has continued to mount similar critiques, both of Sedgwick’s
work and of the whole enterprise
of shame-based affect theory. This
review attempts to address that
critique as it appears both in From
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Guilt to Shame and in an interview
and article that have appeared in
the interim.2
First I should make it clear that
Leys’s book does provide an impassioned, and I would say important, defense of what she calls the
mimetic school of trauma theory.
In this way of thinking, traumatic
experiences are marked and exacerbated by uncontrollable identification and merging with others,
sometimes even the aggressor responsible for causing the trauma.
The founding instability of the
subject that this reflects is one of the
most fundamental tenets of psychoanalysis, so it is easy to understand why Leys, as a thinker with
a strong psychoanalytic bent, might
be critical of the attempt to replace
it with antimimetic theories like
that of Terrence Des Pres and others for whom the cause of trauma
is understood as entirely external to
the subject and “uncontaminated
by any mimetic, fictive, or fantasmatic dimension” (15). The importance of survivor guilt to Leys has
to do with the fact that we experience it over actions that occur only
mimetically and in fantasy (like our
“murderous” wish that someone
else would die in our place), so it
serves as a sort of proof of the mimetic theory of trauma. As she puts
it, “[T]he concept of survivor guilt
is inseparable from the notion of
the subject’s unconscious identification with the other” (10). Our ability to feel guilt over crimes we have

not actually committed is a sign of
the permeability of the subject and
its vulnerability to immersive mimetic identification and the sway
of fantasy. Another way of saying
this would be that the notion of
survivor guilt is incomprehensible
without a psychoanalytic understanding of subjectivity. So the denial of survivor guilt is tantamount
to the repudiation of psychoanalysis. One goal of Leys’s book, then, is
to remind us of the psychoanalytic
insight that we can think and desire
things in our unconscious that we
would find morally repugnant in
our waking lives, but that this does
not necessarily make us complicit
with evil.
In chapter 4, however, which
she describes as “arguably the heart
of my book,” Leys moves into more
problematic territory. Here “the
theme of trauma . . . recedes,” and
she draws a connection between
the antimimetic critiques of survivor guilt and contemporary shame
theory, which she sees as having
“taken the place” of survivor guilt,
replacing its “intentionalist paradigm” with an “anti-intentionalist”
and “material” one (16). In Leys’s
narrative, the rejection of survivor
guilt gives rise to a culturewide
preoccupation with shame as “a
dominant emotional reference in
the West” (4). She portrays this shift
“from guilt to shame” in alarmist
terms as a shift “away from questions of human agency” (150),
leading to “an impulse to displace

On Leys’s From Guilt to Shame
questions about our moral responsibility for what we do in favor of
more ethically neutral or different
questions about our personal attributes” (131; emphasis in original),
and she predicts that the displacement of guilt with shame will lead
to a sort of narcissistic quietism that
entails nothing less than “giving up
disagreement about intention and
meaning” (13).
This represents a crisis for Leys.
But rather than discuss this supposed shift in the same psychoanalytic terms she used to critique
antimimetic trauma theory, Leys
resorts to decidedly unpsychoanalytic notions of individual agency
and responsibility to sound her
warning. Whereas in chapters 1–3
she advocates a complex and rigorously psychoanalytic understanding of the psyche and critiques
what she calls a “quasireligious idea
of a conscience” (66) in the work
of Terrence Des Pres and “more
traditional notions of individual
responsibility and consciousness”
(14) in the work of Robert Lifton,
in her treatment of shame theory
in chapter 4 she seems almost to
be channeling Des Pres and Lifton, becoming herself a defender
of moralistic notions of personal responsibility, agency, meaning, and
intentionality. The question arises,
why does Leys feel the need to portray the recent upsurge in interest
in shame as the consequence of the
rejection of survivor guilt and to
do so in such alarmist, moralizing
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terms that seem so at odds with her
sophisticated psychoanalytic critique of antimimetic trauma theory
in the book’s earlier chapters?
Shame Theory, Identity,
Subjectivity
Despite Leys’s argument to the
contrary, shame theory (especially
Sedgwick’s) cannot be grouped
alongside or seen as a logical development of those antimimetic theories that see trauma as a “purely
external event that befalls a fully
constituted if passive subject” (9).
Shame may be about “who one is”
more than “what one does,” but
that does not mean that shame theory assumes the existence of a “fully
constituted subject.” In Sedgwick’s
work, shame is “not at all the place
where identity is most securely attached to essences, but rather . . .
the place where the question of
identity arises most originarily and
most relationally.”3
Sedgwick is interested in identity and she sees shame as a crucial
mechanism of its constitution, but
this does not mean that she sees
shame as an “attribute of personhood” (131) as Leys claims. The
phrase “attribute of personhood”
suggests a static understanding of
the self that reverberates instead
with Leys’s own condescending
judgment of what she seems to
see as the naïve identitarianism of
shame theory (and implicitly of
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queer theory). Leys’s work, in other
words, is based on a fundamental
misunderstanding of queer theory
and the queer critique of identity.
This is made very obvious early
in chapter 4 when she describes
Sedgwick’s work as being “focused
on questions of queer identity, not
trauma” (125). Anyone who has
read any of Sedgwick’s work (see
especially her classic essay “How to
Bring Your Kids Up Gay”) knows
that, for Sedgwick, (a) being queer
does constitute trauma in a heteronormative society and (b) queer
identity is an oxymoron since queer
is a term invented precisely in order
to critique and deconstruct identity.4
Queer theorists like Sedgwick
might use the term queer to modify
people now and then, but they are
always careful to insist that queerness does not designate any stable
set of subjective experiences or any
easily defined demographic group.
Often Sedgwick put it in scare
quotes to signal that it is far from a
self-evident term, or even in parentheses and scare quotes in moments
when she might seem to be suggesting otherwise, as when she writes
that “at least for certain (‘queer’)
people shame is simply the first,
and remains a permanent, structuring fact of identity” (64).5 Needless
to say, Sedgwick’s own position as a
“straight” woman who considered
herself queer made her exquisitely
aware of the shifty malleability
of the term. But Leys uses “queer
identity” quite unproblematically

as if it were a synonym for “gay” or
“lesbian” identity. In the absence of
any discussion of what exactly Leys
herself means by “queer identity,”
we are forced to assume that she
sees queerness as another one of
those (or perhaps even the prototypical) “personal attributes” that
shame theorists want to focus on
solipsistically.
It is remarkable that Leys says
almost nothing about the context of
Sedgwick’s work on shame. Leys
does describe her as a queer theorist but does little to explain how
that might inform Sedgwick’s interest in shame. At one point, Leys
writes, “Normally we cannot be
held responsible for who we are in
the same way we can be held responsible for what we do—or what
we imagine we have done” (131),
after which she proceeds to explain
how guilt and survivor guilt inevitably entail questions of responsibility and agency while shame is
“the affect of disempowerment”
(132). But this distinction between
what you do and who you are is, in
the case of queer theory, not at all
one that can be taken for granted in
the way that the word “normally”
in this sentence so blithely suggests.
As Sedgwick taught us long ago,
the distinction between “conduct”
and “status” is nothing less than a
constitutive double bind for queeridentified people. “Normal” people
(the “we” of Leys’s sentence) may
not be held responsible just for who
they are, but minorities of all kinds

On Leys’s From Guilt to Shame
certainly have been and in many
respects continue to be shamed for
who they are. The oppression of
queer-identified people derives its
energy, moreover, not just from
shame but from a constant “headsI-win–tails-you-lose” shifting back
and forth between guilt and shame.
This is made clear in the endless
“nature vs. nurture” debates about
what makes people gay, or lesbian,
or transgender, or otherwise queer.
If being queer is a choice, then
you’re guilty for having made it.
And if it’s a biological condition,
then we ought to find a cure! If
guilt is about “conduct” and shame
is about “status,” it is the double
bind between them that is especially relevant to the experience of
queers. Or, rather, the specific way
in which shame and guilt interact
around queerness is itself constitutive of the experience of being
queer. So no wonder Sedgwick, as
a queer theorist, was interested in
joining this debate.
Leys writes that Sedgwick is
interested in shame because it is
a “technology for creating queer
identity as the experience of pure
difference” (154). This is a very
extreme way of describing what
is actually a very nuanced idea
with which Sedgwick does smart
and beautiful things in her writing, including the notion of the
“nonce taxonomy” with its tension
between unclassifiable uniqueness
and rigorous systematicity.6 With
the phrase “queer identity as the
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experience of pure difference,”
however, Leys produces a caricature of Sedgwick’s interest in difference, reducing it to the level of
a simplistic fixation on “personal
identity.” Sedgwick’s emphasis on
the ways in which people are different from each other was never
about passive resignation to the
status quo or a navel-gazing interest in “personal identity.” It was a
way of combating a cultural order
that she saw as aggressively, and
sometimes murderously, enforcing consensus and uniformity. Far
from being a way to avoid conflict
or ignore “meaning and intention,”
it was a way to explore the most
subtle and extreme forms of difference. This is not at all “ethically
neutral.” It is the hard work of ethics. Her interest in shame stemmed
from a deep interest in what it feels
like to be minoritized. And while
she was really, truly, respectfully interested in how people are different
from each other, she also wanted
to understand how the majority is
constituted by exploiting, distorting, and ignoring these differences.
Objectless Emotions
Another aspect of Sedgwick’s work
that worries Leys is the way in
which shame theory and other affect theory supposedly strips the
emotions of their “meaning” and
their proper objects. For Sedgwick,
following Silvan Tomkins, affects
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are distinguished from the drives
by their ability to attach to any kind
of object. So while hunger, for example, has food as its only object,
interest, enjoyment, rage, or shame
can be felt in relation to all kinds
of objects, including other affects.
This lack of an intrinsic connection
between the affects and their objects
means that they are much freer than
the drives, and for both Sedgwick
and Tomkins this is what accounts
for the extraordinary richness and
malleability of human motivation
and experience. For Leys, however,
this same freedom of the affects
sounds impoverishingly arbitrary
because it
makes it a delusion to say that
you are happy because your
child got a job, or sad because
your mother died, for the
simple reason that your child’s
getting a job or your mother’s
death are merely triggers for
your happiness or sadness,
which are themselves innate
affect programs that could in
principle be triggered by anything else. (147)
This move is typical of Leys’s
somewhat exaggerated rhetorical
strategy. Just because there is no
necessary connection between an
affect and its object does not mean
that there is no connection at all or
that once that connection is formed
it does not have any meaning or intentionality. But be that as it may, in

order to understand why this theory of affects might be appealing to
Sedgwick, we have to see her work
within the context of the longer history of queer theory. In her interest
in the freedom of the affects, Sedgwick is actually following the lead
of Freud, who first decoupled the
object from the “aim” of sexuality
in his Three Essays on the Theory of
Sexuality (1905), arguing that they
were not connected by any natural
necessity, but “merely soldered together.”7 By denying any intrinsic
connection between the aim and
the object of the libido, Freud was
able to denaturalize heterosexuality, a crucial first step in the theorization of sexuality. “From the
point of view of psychoanalysis,” he
wrote, “the exclusive sexual interest felt by men for women is also a
problem that needs elucidating and
is not a self-evident fact based upon
an attraction that is ultimately of a
chemical nature.”8
The affects, of course, are even
freer than the Freudian libido,
which is one reason why affect
theory is so appealing to Sedgwick.
Leys follows Sedgwick up until
this point, recognizing her appreciation of the lack of instrumentality and freedom of the affects
as a way to critique the Freudian repressive hypothesis, according
to which all human behavior is
to be explained by the pulsations
of a single, end-oriented libidinal drive. But she draws the line
at Sedgwick and Tomkins’s claim
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that this freedom of object choice
also implies that the affects can be
autotelic in nature. “I consider this
a mistake,” she writes: “It doesn’t
follow that because the affects can
have a multiplicity—even a vast
multiplicity—of objects they are
inherently without any relation to
objects whatsoever. The mistake, in
other words, is thinking that having multiple objects undoes objectality altogether.” This is another
huge leap. It is one thing to say that
there is no inherent or intrinsically
necessary relation between an affect
and its object, or even that affects
can be self-amplifying (hence autotelic), and quite another to say that
this “undoes objectality altogether.”
Leys puts the ostensibly disturbing
conclusion to be drawn from this
“mistake” in italics: “In short, for
Tomkins and Sedgwick the affects are
nonintentional states” (135).
It is by no means clear that Sedgwick and Tomkins would actually
go so far as this. But it is clear that
the idea make Leys very nervous.
The nightmarish conclusion that
she draws from it is that Sedgwick’s
“theory of affect therefore appears
to give primacy to the feelings of a
subject without a psychology and
without an external world” (148).
For Leys, the idea that affects
would not mean anything leads
straight to a world where people
are content just to feel their differences from one another rather than
argue over them, where the universal and the true are eclipsed by the
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particular and the subjective, and
the reader’s interpretation matters
more than the author’s intention.
In other words, she sees shame
theory like that of Tomkins and
Sedgwick as partaking in a (for her,
dystopian) postmodern worldview.
Not surprisingly, she cites Walter
Benn Michaels here on the “end
of history” and the “posthistoricist
valuation of identity” and suggests
that this is where Sedgwick’s work
is leading us.9
I am not in a position to judge
whether Leys’s claim that the work
of Tomkins and others such as Paul
Ekman on the universal and innate
(rather than culturally determined
and cognitively driven) nature of
the affect system on which much of
Sedgwick’s work is based is scientifically inaccurate. It must be said,
however, that for Sedgwick it matters much less whether it is right
or wrong than whether it is useful and productive as a theoretical
paradigm—whether it is “good to
think with.” As Leys also points out,
Sedgwick is quite open about her
own position on this. She called it
moving from the rather fixated question Is a particular
piece of knowledge true?
and how can we know? to
the further questions: What
does knowledge do?—the
pursuit of it, the having and
exposing of it, the receiving
again of knowledge one already knows? How, in short,
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is knowledge performative, and how best does one
move among its causes and
effects?10
It may be simply that the performative effect and value of affect theory in the context of literary
studies, where it is not in the majority, is different from its effect and
value in the context of psychology,
where it is. Leys wants to back up
her own position with the authority of scientific proof when in fact
it seems that she herself may be
motivated to defend the guilt side
because she prefers to “think with
guilt.” Rather than being up front
about this, however, she appeals to
the authority of science.
***
But what is really a shame about
Leys’s book is its refusal to engage with shame theory, especially
queer shame theory on its own
terms. She is so intent on recounting her own narrative of cultural
decline from guilt to shame that
she misses almost everything that
is valuable about what these writers are doing. One has the sense in
reading her work that she is simply
not interested in it. In a recent interview, she was asked a question
that, despite its potentially ominous
implications, might actually have
led in a productive direction. That
question was “How would your

emphasis on guilt alter our understanding of the construction of
queer identity?” Leys responds by
saying, “[A]t least it would make
questions of meaning and agency
of central interest because . . . guilt
is tied to the question of one’s (real
or imagined) intentions to act in a
certain way, whereas shame shifts
attention from questions of agency
and meaning to questions of personal identity.”11
It is hard to determine precisely
what Leys is suggesting here, although one might be forgiven for
thinking that she is saying that
queers are somehow evading responsibility (for their queerness?)
by focusing too much on shame
and too little on guilt. And yet she
hastens to add that she is not completely rejecting the “relevance of
shame” either. She assures us later
in the same paragraph that “nothing I say critically about shame theory today is meant to reject the view
that shame may be an appropriate response to certain situations.”
The wording here is nothing short
of bizarre—as if the question ever
was, or ever could be, whether or
not shame was appropriate.
For myself, as a queer theorist
and a scholar of Japanese literature,
I cannot help but be reminded in
reading Leys’s work of the tired
and (one thought) discredited arguments that anthropologists used
to make about so-called shame culture versus guilt culture. This argument, which formed the backbone
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of one of the most devastating
forms of Western Orientalism, was
most famously put forth in Ruth
Benedict’s wartime book The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (1946), a
work that, as Marylin Ivy has recently put it, “produced Japan as a
‘shame culture’ for American delectation.” Benedict argued (without ever visiting Japan) that the
Japanese had no sense of self strong
enough to experience guilt—the
latter being the hallmark of more
“advanced” Western cultures. As
Ivy puts it, in Benedict’s book,
Ashamed, shame appears as
less developed, less autonomous, less evolved than guilt.
Shame is felt always in relation to the Other, unlike guilt
with its sturdy, consistent
standards of morality (guilt is
confessable). Shame is more
primitive. Shame allows the
most heinous deeds, and all is
well, as long as these crimes
are not exposed to the gaze
of the world. Guilt does not
depend on crime’s revelation.
Guilt is internalized, autonomous; shame is externalized, heteronomous. Guilt
is fixed; shame is mutable.
Guilt is American; shame is
Japanese.12
Leys herself cites Benedict’s work
and the notion of shame cultures
completely uncritically at the beginning of chapter 4, which tells
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the alarming story of what she calls
“shame’s revival.”13 So for Leys, it
would seem, we are all in danger
of turning Japanese. But it is simply
wrong to characterize the rise of an
interest in shame among queer-affect theorists as what Leys describes
as “a means of avoiding the moralisms associated with the notion
of guilt.” This makes it sound as
though “Sedgwick and others” are
somehow trying to get away with
something that is morally suspect.
In my view, and I think in Sedgwick’s, guilt and shame are not so
easily separated, and certainly not
useful in isolation as descriptors either of entire cultures or whole historical moments, be they Japanese
or queer, then or now.
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at Boston University. He is the author of
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